Similarities and Differences Across Generations in the Partisan Gender Gap*

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Abstract

This manuscript examines how white women’s, white men’s, black women’s, and black men’s Democratic Party identification varies as a function of cohort effects, period effects, and life-cycle effects. A unique dataset of Gallup surveys between 1950 and 2012 composed of over 1,500 surveys and more than 2 million individuals is analyzed using a cross-classified random-effects model. The combination of this dataset and method offers a unique ability to understand the change and differences across political generations; with the first observations occurring only 30 years after the passage of the 19th Amendment a sizable proportion of the sample came of age politically before suffrage. I find that most of the difference between men’s and women’s partisanship is fairly stable for both life-cycle and cohort effects. Rather, most of the change in the difference between men’s and women’s partisanship occurs as a function of period effects.

* Results reported in this manuscript are preliminary and likely to change. Please contact the author for the most recent version of the manuscript if you would like to cite the findings.
When the 19th Amendment was ratified, securing women’s right to vote, many believed that women would follow the direction of their fathers, husbands, and brothers when it came to politics (McConnaughy 2013). Close to 100 years later, sex differences in both partisanship and vote choice are important and enduring features of electoral politics (Ondercin N.d.b, Huddy et al. 2008). The partisan gender gap has been growing slowly for several decades, as women have become more aligned with the Democratic Party and men more aligned with the Republican Party. The gender gap in partisanship is fundamentally a macro-level phenomena (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004, Ondercin N.d.b). Additionally, a considerable amount of research examines the micro-level foundations for the gender gap (Diekman & Schneider 2010, Huddy et al. 2008). This paper fills the gap between these two literatures by connecting the micro-level and macro-level behaviors by examining how men’s and women’s partisanship evolved as a function of generational replacement, period effects, and age. This study enhances not only our understanding of the gender gap in partisanship, but also how individuals and groups change their partisan attachments over time.

This project uses a unique dataset and methodological approach to examine the gender gap in partisanship. First, the data set consists of approximately 1,500 Gallup Surveys administered between 1950 and 2012, and includes responses from over 2 million respondents. While the topic of these surveys varied over time, Gallup consistently asked partisanship and basic demographic questions. The Gallup surveys provide unique insights into men’s and women’s voting patterns because the early surveys contain women who came of age politically before and shortly after the passage of the 19th Amendment. Second, I use a cross-classified random-effect model developed by Yang (2008) that separates the influence of generational replacement, period effects, and age in repeated cross-sectional data.

This paper proceeds as follows. I first provide an overview of our understanding of the formation and evolution of the gender gap in partisanship before and after the passage of suffrage. Drawing on both the gender gap and partisanship literatures, I then offer a series of
expectations about the influence of generational replacement, period effects, and age. Next, I discuss the specification of the mixed-effects model and the construction of the Gallup dataset. The following section, presents my results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of my findings.

**Men’s and Women’s Partisan Attachments**

Despite partisan politics being traditionally seen as the domain of men because of its location in the public sphere, women have been tied to the parties throughout U.S. history (Andersen 1996, Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004, Freeman 2002, Corder & Wolbrecht 2016). Even during women’s battle to win the right to vote, McConnaughy (2013) observes that “Regardless of whether they believed their partisan leanings ought to be invoked in their suffrage work, prominent suffrage advocates were identified with nearly every political party that entered national electoral politics during the seventy-plus years of the movement(page 51).” Before gaining the right vote, women were engaged fundamentally in partisan activities, such as creating banners, engaging in debates, writing letters, and other campaign activities (Freeman 2002, Gustafson 1997). Women continued their connections with the political parties after the passage of the 19th Amendment. Which party women chose seemed to be tied to the dominate party in their geographical region (Andersen 1996, Corder & Wolbrecht 2016).

The role of women in politics largely faded from journalist and scholarly attention for several decades, likely due to two reasons. First, the lack of systematic survey data in the early part of the 20th century limited our abilities to study the behavior of sub-groups in the electorate. Second, early work with survey data downplayed differences between men’s and women’s political behavior. Many scholars saw women’s votes and partisan identities tied to their husbands. When differences did exist, they were explained away. For example, Camp-
bell et al. (1966) observes “Women in our samples consistently show slight differences in vote partisanship by comparison with men, being 3-5 percent more Republican. However, much of this discrepancy is traceable not to something unique in female political assessments, but to aggregate differences in other social characteristics between the sexes.” Thus, for several decades little attention was paid to understanding women’s role in partisan politics. This changed in the aftermath of the 1980 presidential election, when the National Organization of Women published a post-election analysis in their newsletter. They observed men were more likely (54%) than women (46%) to support Ronald Reagan in the 1980 election, and termed this differences of 8% the “gender gap” (Mansbridge 1985, for American Women & Politics 2012).

Since the 1980 presidential election, differences in men’s and women’s vote choice (Cassese & Barnes 2016, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999) and partisanship (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004, Ondercin N.d.b, Ondercin N.d.a) have become increasingly examined by scholars. Figure 1 plots the difference between men’s and women’s Democratic Party identification between 1950 and 2012. The diamonds represented quarterly averages from Gallup Surveys. The dashed Lowess line allows us to more easily see the patterns in the data. In the 1950s the gender gap was small, averaging less than one percentage point, and inconsistent in its direction. The gender gap begins to grows, averaging about 2.3 percent and becomes more consistent in the 1960s.

It is helpful to look at the gender gap broken down into it respective parts: men’s and women’s partisanship. Figure 2 shows men’s and women’s Democratic Party identification between 1950 and 2012. The open circles represent quarterly estimates of men’s partisanship and the dashed line is a Lowess line of men’s partisanship to help with interpretation. The solid diamonds correspond to the quarterly estimates of women’s partisanship and the solid line is a Lowess line for women’s partisanship. As we see in Figure 2 after 1963 women’s Democratic Party identification has always been higher than men’s Democratic Party iden-
Figures 1 and 2 show that the gender gap observed in the 1980 election was more than a decade in the making. After the gap in partisanship emerges in the 1960s, men’s and women’s partisan identification continued to grow apart for the next several decades. The gap averaged 3.4 percent in the 1970s, 5.2 percent in the 1980s, 6.8 percent in the 1990s, 8.5 percent in the 2000s, and 11.7 percent between 2010 and 2012. Figure 2 highlights that the early gender gap was formed largely by men moving away from the Democratic Party at a faster rate than women. However, more recently it appears that women have contributed to the gap by increasing their Democratic Party identification.

Different explanations for the gender gap in partisanship have been offered over the years. First, men and women hold different positions on issues that align with the issues owned by the parties. Women tend to be more supportive of issues traditionally associated with the Democratic Party. Two of the longest standing and most persistent issue differences between
men and women concern the size and scope of government and the use of force domestically and abroad (Huddy et al. 2008, Kellstedt, Peterson & Ramirez 2010). Differences in men’s and women’s preferences have been linked to differences in both vote choice and partisan attachments (Chaney, Alvarez & Nagler 1998, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999).

Second, changes within the parties could serve as cues that lead to the formation of the gender gap. The electorate has come to view the Democratic Party as better at dealing with “women’s issues” (Dolan 2014). The electorate also sees the Democratic Party as more feminine and the Republican Party as more masculine (Winter 2010). Thus, men and women may use signals from the parties regarding which social identities are represented by the parties and shift their partisan attachments to align with their gendered social identities. Changes in party identification in response to transformations of party imagine are not uncommon. Norrander (1999) argues the gender gap formed as part of Southern realignment. This idea is supported by Ondercin (N.d.b), who finds that Southern realignment had a larger
effect on men’s partisan attachments than compared to women. Moreover, Ondercin (N.d.b) finds that women have been attracted to the Democratic Party as women have become more visible in the Democratic Party’s congressional delegation.

Third, over the past several decades women’s and men’s roles in society have fundamentally changed. Diekman & Schneider (2010) argues that the gender gaps in issues, vote, and partisanship reflect the roles that men and women play in society. Thus, as these roles change we will observe changes in political preferences. Manza and Brooks (1998) provide support for this broader theory by finding women’s workforce participation has contributed to the gender gap at the individual-level. At the macro-level, there has been limited support for the idea that women’s workforce participation is tied to the gender gap (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004, Ondercin N.d.b). However, Box-Steffensmeier et. al. (2004) finds that the gender gap grows as in response to increases in the number of single women in the population.

Setting aside the specific causes of the gender gap in partisanship, this manuscript seeks to understand how demographic shifts in the electorate have worked to form the gender gap. More specifically, how does generational replacement, period effects, and life-cycle effects influence the gender gap in partisanship? Answering these questions can provide an understanding of how different explanations for the gender gap produce changes in by men’s and women’s partisanship.

**Generational Replacement, Period Effects, and Life-Cycle Effects**

The growing differences observed in men’s and women’s partisan attachments in the aggregate could be driven by individual-level changes in partisanship in three ways. First, as a function of generational replacement, new cohorts of men and women could enter the
electedate holding different partisan preferences. Second, the political environment, or period effects, could make the social identity of gender more salient, making it easier for one to connect their partisan preferences to their gender in the same time period than others. Third, different life events could make the social identity of gender more salient, causing individuals to realign their partisan preferences.

At the individual level, partisanship tends to be a highly stable political identity (Campbell et al. 1966). Once an individual develops a partisan attachment as a young adult, they rarely change that attachment. As a result, we would expect aggregate partisanship to be stable as well. Changes could occur in the aggregate as a function of new generations entering the electorate with different partisan attachments than generations already in the electorate. I expect both men’s and women’s partisanship to change as a result of generational replacement. However, it is not clear whether men and women entering the electorate in the same cohort will hold different partisan preferences.

Jennings (2002) argues events occurring during the impressionable years affecting a subset of a cohort, or a generational unit, can cause that subset to form different and enduring preferences than the rest of the cohort. Thus, events during the impressionable years that influence men and women differently could lead them to enter the electorate with different preferences. For example, we might expect women who came of age politically after the passage of the 19th Amendment to differ from men in their partisan attachments. McCormick explains how the passage of the 19th Amendment transformed women’s perspective on politics: “Women who went through the fight for equal suffrage were inclined to be skeptical and more non-partisan than men... Women who inherited the vote without effort on their part are likely to be partisans; they were enfranchised into a party rather than into citizenship” (Andersen 1996: 75). Moreover, women’s social, economic, and political roles continued to change after the passage of the 19th Amendment. Most notably, the second wave of the U.S. women’s movement focused on women’s increased participation and viability in elec-
toral politics. Early explanations of the gender gap saw it as the outcome of the women’s movement (Smeal 1984). Additionally, several scholars link an increased feminist consciousness among women to political preferences that differ from men’s preferences (Conover & Sapiro 1993, Conover 1988). Thus, women who came of age during the second wave may hold different partisan preferences than generations of women who came before them. Similarly, there are events that uniquely influenced men’s party preferences. For example, Erikson & Stoker (2011) demonstrate that men who were subject to the draft lottery in the Vietnam war developed attitudes distinct from those who were not subject to the lottery.

However, research on women’s behavior around the 19th Amendment raise doubts that women’s partisan leanings fundamentally differed from men’s attachments. Corder & Wolbrecht (2016) find that in the elections immediately after the passage of the 19th Amendment, women were likely to be recruited and mobilized by the locally dominant political party, resulting in little difference in vote choice between women and men (also see, Andersen 1996). Moreover, one’s partisanship is most likely inherited from one’s parents (Jennings 2002), and it is not clear that the rate of transmission is different for men and women. This implies men and women could start off with very similar political leanings when they enter the electorate.

While there is considerable evidence on the stability of partisanship at the individual level, we also observe change in mass partisan attachments that cannot be attributed to generational replacement (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004). Social identity theories of partisanship argue that individuals change their partisanship in response to either (1) changes in the political parties’ representation of these social identities or (2) different social identities becoming salient to how individuals view themselves politically. These factors may cause men and women to adjust their partisanship at different points in their lives.

Changes in the political parties’ representation of social identities could influence men’s and women’s partisanship through generational replacement, and cause men and/or women
in the electorate, regardless of age, to shift their partisan identities. While the 20th century largely was been defined by Democratic Party dominance following the New Deal, the parties evolved substantially. Notably, issue evolution around race facilitated mass party change (Carmines & Stimson 1989). Additionally, the political parties have gone through issue evolutions regarding women’s issues, abortion, and feminism (Wolbrecht 2000, Wolbrecht 2002, Sanbonmatsu 2002, Adams 1997). As signals from the parties regarding issues positions and social identities become clearer, individuals in the electorate have shifted their political identities (Levendusky 2009, Stoker & Jennings 2008). As the messages and images from the political parties change, men and women are better able to pick up signals and adjust their partisanship.

Finally, life events also shape men’s and women’s partisanship. For example, motherhood causes some women to become more conservative in their partisan identity, ideological leanings, and issue attitudes (Greenlee 2010, Greenlee 2014). At the same time, married men and women are more likely to become similar in their political views over the course of their marriage (Stoker & Jennings 1995). As an individual ages, life events could cause men and women to shift their partisan attachments as their gendered identity shifts in salience regarding their social and political identities.

To understand the growth of the gender gap over time, I assess changes in men’s and women’s partisanship as a function of generational effects, period effects, and life-cycle effects. To do this, I use a mix-effects modeling approach described in the next section.

Model Specification

I use a cross-classified random-effects hierarchical linear model developed by Yang (2008) to separate out the effects of age, period, and cohort. Ideally, to capture the different processes one would use longitudinal data collected by following the same groups of individuals.
over their life time. Such data are extremely rare. The mixed-effects model applied to repeated cross-sectional data allows one to separate the effects of cohorts, periods, and age (Yang 2008, Donnelly et al. 2015).

Equation 1 is the specification of the first-level of the model.

$$Y_{ijk} = \alpha_{jk} + \beta_{1jk}A + \beta_{2jk}A^2 + \beta_{3jk}E + \beta_{4jk}S + \beta_{5jk}M + \beta_{6jk}W + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

$Y_{ijk}$ corresponds to the dichotomous response for the $i^{th}$ respondent for $i = 1, ..., n_{jk}$ individuals within the $j^{th}$ periods for $j = 1, ..., J$ time periods and $k^{th}$ cohort for $k = 1, ..., K$ birth cohort; $A$ and $A^2$ represent age and age-squared, respectively; $E$ denotes level of education; and $S$, $M$, and $W$ represent regional dummy variables for the South, Midwest, and West, respectively. The variables in level-one represent the model’s fixed-effects.

The specification of the second-level or random-effects of the model is represented by Equation 2.

$$\alpha_{jk} = t_j + c_k \quad (2)$$

$\alpha_{jk}$ is a random intercept that varies by both period and cohort. $t_{0j}$ identifies the overall period effect and $c_{0k}$ are the cohort effects.

The focus on sex suggests the need for level-one and level-two interactions to capture how age, period, and cohort effects might vary with sex. However, adding all these interactions greatly complicates the model. Additionally, given the importance of race we would want also to include interactions with race. To simplify estimation and specification of the model, I split the sample into sub-populations and run separate models for white women, white men, black women, and black men.

The model’s current specification has several limitations. First, the specification assumes that the fixed-effects (age, education, and regional dummies) have the same effects for all
cohorts and all years. This assumption is tenuous given the process of Southern realignment. Second, while running the models on sub-samples of the data broken down by sex and race limits the need for interaction terms, I cannot test whether the differences between groups are statistically significant. Further analysis is needed to address these limitations.

Data

The Gallup organization has had at least one survey in the field almost every single month since 1950. Traditionally, the use of these surveys at the individual level of analysis has been limited because the topics and content of the surveys constantly change. However, Gallup consistently ask an individual’s partisanship and basic demographic questions. Gallup Surveys with a national adult sample that were archived with the Roper Center for Public Opinion serve as the basis of the dataset. A total of 1,579 surveys compose the dataset. Each survey was re-coded for consistency over time. Overall, there are just over 2 million individual level respondents in the dataset.

The dependent variable in the analysis is a dichotomous indicator if the respondent identified as a Democrat (1) or other (0). The “other” category includes Republicans and independents. The analysis excludes those who identified other political parties or had no preference. Because Gallup did not consistently follow-up with independents, the independent category contains partisan leaners in addition to pure independents.

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1 These Gallup Survey’s have been used extensively for the study of partisanship at the aggregate level of analysis (for example Ondercin N. d. b, Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002).

2 Some scholars have criticized the use of Gallup surveys because the partisanship question is different from the question used by other survey houses (Converse 1976, Abramson & Ostrom Jr 1991). Gallup asks “In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Republican.” They argue the phrase “In politics today” results in greater short-term variation than questions that use the phrase “Generally speaking.” While there is evidence that the Gallup series do exhibit greater variation, this variation does not appear to greatly influence substantive results (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002, MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992, Bishop et al. 1994). Unfortunately, other surveys do not offer the rich time series that can be compiled from the Gallup surveys.

3 Norrander (1997) raises the issue that the size of the gender gap may be influenced by how partisan leaners are treated.
Life-cycle effects are modeled with the respondent’s age and age-squared. The age-squared term allows for non-linear life-cycle effects. Socio-economic status is often tied to an individual’s partisanship. I use educational attainment as a measure of the respondent’s socio-economic status. Education is coded into 4 categories: (1) did not complete high school, (2) high school, no college, (3) some college, but no degree, and (4) college graduate. The strength of parties and partisans attachments varies regionally across the United States. Therefore, I include a set of dummy variables indicating where the respondent lives. There are four possible regions: East, Midwest, South, and West. In the analysis, East is the omitted region.

In addition to individual-level variables, two group-level variables are included in the analysis. Year, corresponding to the year the survey was administered, measures period effects. To measure generational effects, I created a measure of birth-cohort. I calculated the respondent’s birth year using the respondent’s age and the year the survey was administered. I then classified respondents int birth-cohorts representing five-year spans. Respondents born between 1850 and 1854 make up the first birth-cohort. The last birth-cohort was born between 1990 and 1994. Classifying individuals into generations can be difficult, too long of a time span and you might miss important changes and too short of a time span means it hard to separate period and cohort effects. The five-year span for a cohort is standard in sociology and demography (Yang 2008).
Table 1: Cross-classified Random-Effects Model of Democratic Partisanship by Sex and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Women</th>
<th>White Men</th>
<th>Black Women</th>
<th>Black men</th>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>Age^2</td>
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<td>-0.00***</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>0.16***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Num. groups: cohort</td>
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***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Results

Table 1 reports the results for the cross-classified random-effect model. Starting with the fixed-effects reported at the top of the table, we can see that age and age-squared are significantly related to partisanship, indicating significant life-cycle effects. Given the curvilinear specification it is easiest to interpret these results by looking at them graphically. Figure 3 reports the predicted probability of being a Democrat across the range of age (18-100) for white women (red), white men (green), black women (blue), and black men (purple) for the average cohort and year. For both white women and white men there is a slight decrease in their Democratic Party identification as they age. Additionally, the difference between white women’s and white men’s party identification narrows as they grow older. Democratic Party identification increases for both black men and black women. However, the difference in Democratic Party identification remains constant over the course of black men’s and black women’s lifetime.

The fixed-effects for education are negative and significant for white women, white men, and black men. Education is positive and significantly related to Democratic partisanship for black women. Living in the South, compared to the East, reduces the likelihood of being a Democratic for both men and women, regardless of race. White men and women who live Midwest are less likely to be Democrats compared to white men and white women living in the East. Black men and black women are more likely to identify as Democrats compared to black men and black women in the East. Men and women in the Western part of the United States, regardless of race, are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party compared to individuals living in the Eastern part of the United States.

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Life-cycle Effects
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Cohort Effects
Turning to the random-effect components of the models, we can examine how the probability of being a Democrat varies based on period and cohort effects. The information reported in Table 1 is not very intuitive to interpret, I therefore produced a series of predicted probabilities based on the average age and education for white women, white men, black women, and black men that live in the Eastern part of the United States. Figure 4 reports predicted probability across the range of cohorts. In general, it seems like men and women respond in a similar fashion to events producing little difference between men and women within cohort.

To better understand the influence of birth-cohort on partisanship, it is helpful to consider a few specific cohorts and compare men’s and women’s identification around those time periods. First, cohorts 1-8 came of age politically before the passage of the 19th Amendment. We need to be careful interpreting too much about these early cohorts because they have a limited number of observations, especially for black men and black women. Both white men and white women born in cohorts 1-8 were less likely to identify with the Democratic Party than than those born later cohorts. Individuals who were born in cohort 12 came of age politically in 1932, the critical presidential election for the New Deal. We see increasing Democratic partisanship for all respondents before this election, representing the building support for the Democratic Party. That support continued to grow among black men and black women for several more generations. Among white men and white women, support for the Democratic Party slowly begins to decline starting with those coming of age politically after 1946.

Figure 5 reports the results for the period effects for an individual with average education and age living in the Eastern United States. For white men and women women we see some interesting fluctuations in their probability of identify with the Democratic Party related to the period. For example, before 1960 there is very little difference between men’s and women’s party identification, but during 1960 a small difference emerges and persists. Simi-
Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Period Effects
larly, this difference between men and women grows. The difference in period effects becomes slightly larger in the late 1980s for white men and white women. There also are some distinct period effects for black men and women. We see a large increase in Democratic partisanship for black men and black women during 1960. Similar to white men and white women, there is a considerable amount of shared periods effects, but we also see a few periods where it appears that the gap between black men and black women grows. We see a widening of differences between black men and black women during the late 1960s, which then slightly narrows through the 1980s. The differences between black men and black women then grew again during the 1990s and 2000s.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The above analysis has examined the movement in white men’s, white women’s, black men’s, and black women’s partisanship between 1950 and 2012. In particular, this analysis helps to understand how cohort replacement, period effects, and life-cycle effects contribute to the gender gap in partisanship. Differences between men’s and women’s attachments for both cohort and life-cycle effects are fairly stable. We see more variation in the difference between men and women when we examine period effects. This suggests the gender gap is a function of specific political contexts that cause men and women to shift their attachments and then these attachments.

Sex and race both structure partisan attachments throughout the time period examined here. Both black women and white women were more likely to identify with Democratic Party compared to black men and white men, respectively. Most of the research on partisanship focuses on only race or only sex. Partially the lack of attention is because traditional datasets only have a limited number of observations of black respondents, making systematic analysis of subsets of race difficult. The more expansive dataset used in this project allows one to
examine the intersection of race and sex. The results reported above highlight the need to consider how multiple social identities intersect to shape partisan attachments.

The next steps in this research will more directly model the differences between men and women by including sex as a fixed-effect and cross-level interactions between sex and the random effects. Additionally, other cross-level interactions will need to be examined to make the assumptions of the model more closely reflect political reality.
References


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