# Who is Responsible for the Gender Gap?: The Dynamics of Men's and Women's Democratic Macropartisanship, 1950-2012

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## Abstract

Drawing on research that views partisan attachments as driven by social identities, I argue the gender gap is a function of men and women changing their partisanship as they seek the best representation of their gendered social identity from the political parties. Specifically, changes in the parties due to party realignments and shifts in the composition of their congressional delegations have provided individuals with a clearer signal on which to base their partisan attachments. Men and women have responded differently to these signals and developed different political identities over the past 70 years, resulting in the gender gap in partisanship. To test this theory, I have constructed an innovative macro-level dataset of men's and women's partisan attachments on a quarterly basis between 1950 and 2012. I use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework to estimate patterns of men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship and whether particular factors contribute to the gender gap by having different effects on men's and women's partisanship. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectations, highlight how symbolic images shape partisan attachments, and demonstrate the gender gap is a function of changes in both men's and women's macropartisanship.

The gender gap first garnered publicity in the aftermath of the 1980 presidential election. In addition to the gender gap in vote choice, differences between men and women have been identified in opinions, ideology, knowledge, and partisanship (Wirls 1986, Huddy et al. 2008, Ondercin & Jones-White 2011). Initially heralded as a success of the second wave of the women's movement, these gender gaps were largely attributed to changes in women's political behavior (Abzug 1984, Smeal 1984). Further analyses, however, suggest the gender gap may be less about women's behavior than it is about men's behavior (Wirls 1986, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999, Norrander 1999). Despite a robust body of scholarship on the gender gap, we do not have a clear understanding of the origins of the gender gap in partisanship, or whether the gap is a function of men leaving the Democratic Party or women growing more Democratic.

This manuscript addresses these shortcomings by analyzing the dynamics of men's and women's partisanship separately from 1950 to 2012. Drawing on research that views partisan attachments as driven by social identities (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002), I argue the gender gap is a function of men and women changing their partisanship as they seek the best representation of their gendered social identity from the political parties. Specifically, changes in the parties, due to party realignments and shifts in the composition of the their congressional delegations, have provided individuals with a clearer signal on which to base their partisan attachments. Men and women have responded differently to these signals and developed different political identities over the past 70 years, resulting in the gender gap in partisanship.

This manuscript makes four contributions. First, it furthers our understanding of macro political behavior through examining the political dynamics of subgroups in the electorate. Political identities, such as sex, divide and structure the electorate. Moreover, these divisions have important political implications for electoral politics (Diekman & Schneider 2010, Schaffner 2005). By understanding how sex structures partisan attachments over time we

gain insight into electoral changes. Second, this paper provides a more complete theoretical explanation of the gender gap. While occasionally acknowledging that men's behavior may form the gap, existing research largely has theorized about the gap from the perspective of women's political behavior. The theory proposed here accounts for changes in both men's and women's political behavior and the political parties. Third, the data used in this analysis allows for a better empirical understanding of the gender gap. I have constructed an innovative macro-level dataset of men's and women's partisan attachments on a quarterly basis between 1950 and 2012. Having data on men's and women's partisanship at this level of aggregation is crucial to understanding the gender gap, because, at a fundamental level, the gender gap is a macro phenomenon. Finally, most studies of the gender gap focus on the period after 1980, overlooking earlier movement in men's and women's partisanship. Analyzing men's and women's macropartisanship over time allows us to better understand movements in partisanship that are not election specific and provides a clearer picture of the origins of the gender gap than analyzing the gap in vote choice. Because party realignments and changes in the aggregate affiliations of the electorate are slow to evolve (Brewer & Stonecash 2009, Petrocik 1981), the 62 years of data analyzed here provide unique leverage for understanding the long-term dynamics of men's and women's partisanship.

## The Gender Gap

Differences between men's and women's partisan attachments and vote choice play a critical role in shaping presidential, gubernatorial, Senate, and House elections (Carroll 2006). Combined with women's higher likelihood to turnout to vote, small shifts in the gender gap are magnified in election returns (Diekman & Schneider 2010). Despite decades of research on the gender gap, we have a limited understanding of what drives differences in men's and women's political behavior for four reasons.

First, the vast majority of research on the gender gap tends to be election-centric. That is, most analyses are done post-election and explain the gender gap in vote choice as a function of the salient issues and the characteristics of the voters in particular elections. With respect to the role of issues, men and women have held different opinions for decades concerning the use of force domestically and abroad, social welfare, the environment, and the size and scope of government (Lizotte 2016, Cassese & Barnes 2016, Huddy et al. 2008). These differences are stable and robust across electoral contexts and have been linked to the gender gap in vote choice (Chaney, Alvarez & Nagler 1998). In addition to issue positions, the salience of the issues also appears to matter. For example, while simple differences on social welfare issues appear to explain the gender gap in 1992, it is the salience of social welfare issues to male voters that matters in 1996 (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999).

Electorates' demographic characteristics also are commonly used to explain the study of the gender gap in vote choice. Carroll's (1988) classic thesis argues the gender gap is a function of women's growing economic and psychological independence from men as a result of increased workforce participation. Women's participation in the paid labor force increases their tendency to vote for Democratic presidential candidates (Manza & Brooks 1998). Moreover, differences in the issue positions discussed above largely have been attributed to women's role in society and increased autonomy (Howell & Day 2000, Diekman & Schneider 2010).

These studies are informative, but their focus on elections has limited our understanding of the origins and dynamics of the gender gap in two ways. One, analyses of vote choice identify issue differences as a central explanatory factor of the gender gap, but the differences in men's and women's opinions across issues have remained relatively stable (Kellstedt, Peterson & Ramirez 2010). Accordingly, the focus on issues fails to help us understand why the gap has grown over time. Two, election outcomes do not simply materialize; rather they are products of dynamics occurring between elections (Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002). Studies of vote choice offer only a limited examination of the sources of the gender

gap in partisanship. Yet, partisan attachments fundamentally shape the voting decisions of the electorate (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008) and the gender gap in vote choice (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). An additional by-product of the election-centric nature of gender gap studies has been the focus on post-1980 elections. This overlooks the fact that gender gaps existed before the 1980 presidential election (Norrander 2008). We therefore need to examine men's and women's partisan attachments and expand the temporal scope of our research to understand the origins of the gender gap.

A second limiting factor of existing research is its level of analysis. The gender gap is an aggregate phenomena. The vast majority of research that seeks to understand what factors cause the gender gap, though, is focused on the individual (for exceptions, see Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004, Norrander 1999). Important individual-level processes contribute to the gender gap (Diekman & Schneider 2010); however, how dynamics at the aggregate-level shape these individual-level processes is poorly understood.

Third, and somewhat paradoxically, analyses of the gender gap itself limits our ability to identify the source of the gap. The gender gap is a function of both men's and women's political behavior. Indeed, the gender gap could emerge and/or grow due to any of the following processes, in isolation or combination. First, men's partisanship could change while women's partisanship remains the same. Second, women's partisanship could change and men's partisanship could stay the same. Third, both men's and women's partisanship could change in the same direction but with different magnitudes. Fourth, men's and women's partisanship could change in opposite directions. Therefore, analyzing men's and women's aggregate partisanship separately is necessary to identify and understand the processes underlying the gender gap.

Finally, there is limited theoretical discussion of the role the political parties play in the formation and maintenance of the gender gap. Initial reports of the gender gap suggested the gap was a function of changes occurring within the parties (Abzug 1984, Smeal 1984), but

subsequent studies found little support for this claim (Mansbridge 1985). Norrander (1999) suggests Southern realignment may contribute to the growth of the gender gap; however, her analysis is limited to ocular examination of trends. Important changes have occurred within the parties in terms of policy positions and who makes up the parties-in-government (Wolbrecht 2000). The lack of attention to the political parties suggests we are missing an important piece of the puzzle for understanding the origins of the gender gap.

The study closest to mine is Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin (2004). They use *CBS News/New York Times* surveys to analyze the gender gap in partisanship between 1979 and 2000. This study differs from their article in two ways. First, Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin are limited in what they can say about the gender gap that existed prior to the 1980 election because of the temporal scope of their data. Further, the gap has continued to grow since 2000. By analyzing the period from 1950 to 2012 my analyses allow for insights into the formation of and continued changes in the gender gap not possible given Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin's data. Second, where they analyze the gender gap, I analyze the components of the gap: mens and womens partisanship. As outlined above, analyzing mens and womens partisanship allows for a richer theoretical and empirical understanding of the gender gap.

This paper addresses these shortcomings by offering a theoretical explanation of the gender gap that focuses on how both men and women adjust their partisan attachments in reaction to changes in the political parties. The implications of this theory are then tested on aggregate measures of men's and women's partisanship between 1950 and 2012, providing insight into both the origins of the gender gap and how it has changed over time.

# Theorizing Change in Men's and Women's Partisanship

Gender shapes experiences, expectations, and interests[1] and, consequently, influences the U.S political system in a multitude of ways (Ritter 2008). Further, men's and women's social identities are fundamentally linked to their sex[2] and form the basis of their partisan identification (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). This implies the gender gap's formation is at least partially a result of men and women adjusting their partisan preferences based on the representation of their gendered social identity in the political parties.

## Sex, Representation, and Party Realignments

Individuals select the party that they perceive to best reflect and represent their salient social identities (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). Moreover, the electorate looks for cues from the political parties regarding representation (Levendusky 2009). I contend that changes in the parties as a result of party realignments and changes in the sex composition of their congressional delegations have produced clearer signals for voters in terms of the

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[1]Historical, economic, social, and political contexts have positioned women and men in distinct categories, suggesting that they will also have distinct interests(Beckwith 2014, Sapiro 1981) Men, as a group, also should hold political preferences shaped by their societal position (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). Importantly, analysis of how gender structures men's and women's behavior does not assume homogeneity among men or women as a social group. Rather, gender is one of many social structures and identities individuals use to form partisan attachments.

[2]Early explanations of the on the gender gap that focused on gender/feminist consciousness among women (Conover 1988, Conover & Sapiro 1993) have two theoretical limitations in their ability to explain the gap. First, the gap has continued to grow despite a decline in mobilization. Second, these explanations do not address men's contribution the gap.

representation of their gendered social identities over time. For example, individuals believe the Democratic Party now represents women's interests and the Republican Party is better for men and their interests (Dolan 2014). Moreover, the symbolic image of the parties has been transformed such that the Democratic Party is viewed as feminine and the Republican Party as masculine (Winter 2010). These changes coincided with social and demographic shifts that realigned the substantive interests of men and women with the interests of other social groups found within the respective parties.

The relationship between sex and the political parties has changed greatly over the past several decades. Party differences, as a result of issue evolutions, have emerged around abortion and other women's issues (Wolbrecht 2000, Adams 1997), but the evidence is much weaker for a full realignment around gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Intimately related, feminists found the Democratic Party more welcoming and anti-feminists found a home within the Republican Party (Freeman 1987, Wolbrecht 2002, Deckman 2016). Existing scholarship largely focuses on the impact of a narrow range of "women's issues" and interests. While understandable, focusing only on these specific issues could overlook changes in parties based on issues not explicitly identified as women's issues.

Arguably the largest change between the political parties and sex concerns who is elected to represent the parties-in-government. The number of women in elected office has increased dramatically over the past several decades, but more so in the Democratic Party. In the 1950s and 1960s there were slightly more female Republican officials than female Democratic officials (Wolbrecht 2000). Starting in the 1970s, trends shifted and the number of women elected from the Democratic Party has increased at a greater rate in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures (Sanbonmatsu 2002, Crowder-Meyer & Lauderdale 2014). Moreover, women in elected office are fundamental for the representation of women's interests (Swers 2002). Thus, the changes in the sex composition of the parties-in-government increasingly provide a clearer signal to individuals about the representation of their gendered social

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identities by the parties. Women seeing women elected predominately from the Democratic Party should shape their perceptions of shared interests with the Democratic Party. Women therefore should be drawn to the Democratic Party based on descriptive representation and expectations of better substantive representation. At the same time, men are less likely to see individuals similar to themselves in the Democratic Party and should become less likely to identify with the Democratic Party.

Party realignments also have shaped the images of who the parties represent. The New Deal realignment resulted in an expansion of the federal government that implemented social welfare programs geared towards helping the less fortunate in society and reducing inequality. Over time these social programs have become increasingly associated with minority interests (Gilens 1999, Kinder 1996). Accordingly, the perception of the Democratic Party changed slowly to one dominated by minority interests. Consistent with this claim, the connection between civil rights and women's rights has increased among delegates to party conventions (Wolbrecht 2002). While often not considered part of the New Deal coalition,[3] our perception of the Democratic Party has evolved to incorporate women and their interests. As the Democratic Party has incorporated a more heterogeneous mix of groups, men as a social group, and in particular white men, have found less of a connection with the Democratic Party. As a result, the winning coalition of the Republican Party contains more men (see Busch's (2005) analysis of the Reagan revolution). This explanation fits with the finding that men's attitudes about social welfare spending have become an increasingly important determinant of partisanship (Kaufmann 2002, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999).

The policies resulting from the New Deal are also relevant to women, but not in the same fashion as they are for men. Women tend to be more supportive of social welfare policies

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[3]However, Andersen's (1979) analysis of the realignment process in Chicago between 1928 and 1936 places women within the Democratic Party's coalition. Brewer & Stonecash (2009) also classify women as one of the social groups associated with the New Deal realignment.

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than men (Huddy et al. 2008, Cassese & Barnes 2016). Social changes in the institution of marriage and women's workforce participation greatly changed women's relationship with government (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). The policy goals and ideas of the Democratic Party are more in-line with the policy preferences and goals of women (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). Thus, we should see increases in women's Democratic macropartisanship as the social welfare function of government expands and as women take on new roles, such as paid employment.

While rarely acknowledged in work on the gender gap, changes in women's position in society are not independent of changes in men's position and role in society. Men in the paid labor force interact with women more often at work and are more likely to have wives or mothers that participate in the paid labor force. Men's experiences with women in the workforce may lead them to develop greater sympathy for the challenges women face, resulting in more feminist attitudes by men (Banaszak & Plutzer 1993). However, feminist attitudes may not translate into Democratic voting and partisanship. Women's workforce participation and greater independence can be seen as a threat to men's economic power and privilege (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010, Kaufmann 2002), causing men to shift their partisan attachments away from the Democratic Party towards the more traditional, conservative rhetoric of the Republican Party. It therefore is unclear how women's workforce participation should influence men's Democratic macropartisanship.

While not new, Southern realignment continues to shape partisan politics. The solid Democratic majority found in the states of the Confederacy has vanished in both the mass electorate and elected officials (Black & Black 2002). Additionally, the process of Southern realignment has been linked to the gender gap in partisanship and vote choice (Norrander 1997, 1999). Due to changes within the parties over issues of race, white men in the South fled the Democratic Party (Carmines & Stimson 1989). Women in the South were slower to change their partisan attachments, creating a gender gap in partisanship (Norrander 1999, Ondercin 2013). The process of Southern realignment should result in further declines in

men's Democratic partisanship. Southern realignment's effect on women's partisanship is less clear because of the cross-cutting influences of regional identity and gender identity. Not only did Southern realignment shift regional party attachments, but it further aligned the interests of the Democratic Party with those of minorities. This implies the effects of Southern realignment should not be limited to individuals in the South; rather, Southern realignment should act as a cue about the make-up and interests of the Democratic Party throughout the country.

Finally, political and economic evaluations explain changes in partisan attachments (Downs 1957, Fiorina 1977), especially at the macro-level (Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002).[4] Such evaluations influence short-term fluctuations and can have enduring effects on macropartisanship. It is unclear, though, exactly how economic and political evaluations contribute to the gender gap in partisanship. There is considerable evidence that men and women evaluate politics and the economy differently. Gender gaps in partisanship and vote choice extend to gender gaps in presidential approval (Wirls 1986, Gilens 1988). Men and women also tend to evaluate government performance on social welfare and military issues differently (Gilens 1988, Fite, Genest & Wilcox 1990). Additionally, regardless of which party holds the White House, women tend to offer more negative evaluations of the economy, a driving force behind differences in presidential approval (Clarke et al. 2005).

## Measurement

Assessing men's and women's partisan attachments requires two dependent variables: *Men's Democratic Macropartisanship* and *Women's Democratic Macropartisanship*. I cal-

[4]Political campaigns are not examined in this analysis. However, there is little evidence that campaigns have an effect on voter's underlying partisan attachments (Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002).

culate men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship as the proportion of Democrats among Democratic, Republican and independent identifiers for men and women, respectively. The dependent variables are quarterly time series from 1950-2012 constructed from Gallup surveys archived at the *Roper Center for Public Opinion*. Only surveys with a national adult sample were used to create the measures of partisanship. Overall, 1579 Gallup surveys contributed to the quarterly estimates. There is at least one survey every quarter, with a mean of 6 surveys per quarter. Surveys that spanned multiple months were coded based on their start date. Men's and women's Democratic partisanship was calculated for each survey and then aggregated, weighted based on the survey's sample size. The Gallup surveys allow for the creation of a longer time series with more frequent observations than other commonly used surveys. For example, and as noted above Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin (2004) use the *CBS/New York Times* to model the gender gap in partisanship. This limits their analysis to a start date of 1979. Similarly, the National Election Studies (NES) and General Social Survey (GSS) are commonly used to model men's and women's behavior at the individual level, but produce a limited number of observations for aggregate analyses (Norrander 2008, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). The appendix discusses the use of Gallup Surveys to measure partisanship, descriptive statistics for men's and women's partisanship and explanatory variables used in the analyses, and the sources for the explanatory variables.

The quarterly measures of men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship are displayed in Figure 1. One of the most striking characteristics of Figure 1 is the shared movement between men's and women's partisanship from 1950 to 2012. This suggests the same underlying process(es) might be causing changes to men's and women's partisanship. The early gender gap was slow to emerge, with small differences slowly evolving over several decades. The average difference between men's and women's partisanship was less than one percentage point and not in a consistent direction in the 1950s. During the 1960s, men's and women's partisanship grew apart slightly, with differences averaging about 2.3 percent.

Figure 1: Men's and Women's Democratic Macropartisanship, Quarterly 1950-2012

Importantly, despite these differences being small, after 1963 women's Democratic Party identification has always been higher than men's Democratic Party identification.

During the 1970s, the difference between men's and women's party identification grew by about a point, averaging 3.4 percent. As we would expect based on our current understanding of the gender gap, at the end of the 1970s, men's and women's Democrtic partisan attachments diverged further as men moved away from the Democratic Party at a faster rate than women. Notable given the conventional wisdom, the gender gap in partisanship existed and was persistent before the 1980 presidential election. The gap has continued to widen each subsequent decade, averaging 5.2 percent in the 1980s, 6.8 percent in the 1990s, 8.5 percent in the 2000s, and 11.7 percent between 2010 and 2012. During these later decades, the growth in the gap appears to be caused by increasing women's Democratic Partisanship *and* decreasing men's Democratic partisanship. Overall, Figure 1 suggests that the gender gap in partisanship is likely a complex function of movement in men's and women's partisan

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attachments.

## Explanatory Variables

*Women's Representation* is designed to capture the increasing presence and visibility of women in the Democratic Party's congressional delegation, which acts as a signal to individuals about the representation of gendered interest. This measure consists of two components. The first component is calculated by subtracting the proportion of women in the Republican delegation from the proportion of women in the Democratic delegation. This quantity is then multiplied by the total number of Democratic women in Congress. Larger positive values therefore indicate an increased visibility of women in the Democratic Party's congressional delegation in absolute terms and relative to their representation in the Republican Party's congressional delegation.

I use per captia government expenditures on social benefits in constant 1995 U.S. dollars (*Social Spending*) to proxy the policy changes associated with the New Deal Realignment. The increased role the government plays in economic and social policies has been the defining feature of the New Deal realignment (Brewer & Stonecash 2009), with the Democratic Party associated with its social welfare policies. Thus, the actual changes in the amount of social welfare benefits provided by the federal government should be related to changes in perceptions of the Democratic Party. Moreover, the expansion of the government's social welfare benefits are tied to larger social changes for women (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). *Women's Workforce Participation* captures changing demographic patterns that have shifted women's and men's interests. It is measured as the proportion of the civilian labor force that are women. *Southern Realignment* identifies the changing composition of the Democratic Party and is measured as the proportion of Democrats in the Southern delegation to the U.S. Congress.

Finally, I control for economic and political evaluations that could influence partisanship.

Economic evaluations are measured using the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (*Consumer Sentiment*). This index is available quarterly beginning in 1952, with a few quarters missing early in the series. Any missing data were interpolated by using the average of the two time points before and after the missing observation. I multiplied the series by negative 1 during Republican presidential administrations to adjust for differing effects.[5] Political evaluations are modeled using presidential approval from Gallup surveys. The influence of the economy is purged from the approval measure by regressing consumer sentiment on the presidential approval series and using the residuals. The *Approval* series is also recoded based on presidential administrations and the first quarter of a new presidency is dropped to account for changes in presidential administrations.

## Model Specification

The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on three questions. What factors influence men's Democratic macropartisanship? What factors influence women's Democratic macropartisanship? And are these effects different for men and women, therefore contributing to the formation of the gender gap? To answer these questions, my analysis relies on a seemingly unrelated regression (or SUR) framework. The SUR is a system of equations; in this case one equation equation for men's partisanship and one equation for women's partisanship. The main advantage of the SUR framework, for my purpose, is that it allows for a direct test of whether a given factor has a significantly different effect on men's partisanship than it does on women's partisanship.

Before estimating the SUR, we need to consider two issues associated with the dynamic data generating process for each variable. First, each variable, or univariate time series, can be generated by multiple temporal processes. For example, the univariate series of

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[5]See appendix for details.

*Men's Partisanship* is a random or stochastic process. However, there are multiple dynamic processes that influence how exogenous shocks at time, $t$, influence observations of the variable at $t+1$. These dynamic components can be identified using a basic Box-Jenkins ARIMA($p, I, q$) model.[6] The ARIMA($p, I, q$) model can then be used filter these dynamics from the univariate time series, leaving "white noise" residuals, or the stochastic element of the series. Second, the temporal data generating process for each variable may be different. For instance, changes at time $t$ to *Social Spending* are permanently integrated into the series, impacting future values of *Social Spending*, while changes in *Approval* at time $t$ have a diminishing influence on future values of *Approval*. When univariate dynamics or series with different dynamic processes are not properly modeled there is an increased risk of spurious results (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, Enders 2008). To address these issues, each univariate series is filtered using an ARIMA($p, I, q$) model to produce stochastic "white noise" residuals. The series that results form the filtering process represents pure innovations that can be explained by other variables. As Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2014) explain, this process gives us "confidence that any time series properties of the data will not account for any observed correlation between the covariates and the dependent variable (p27)." Information about the ARIMA($p, I, q$) modeling of each univariate time series can be found in the Appendix.

The preceding section offers theoretical expectations regarding how the covariates are related to men's and women's partisanship. However, theory is rarely precise enough to specify the temporal dynamics of these relationships. For example, I expect that women's increased visibility as part of the Democratic Party's congressional delegation should influence men's and women's partisanship, but I do not know whether a change in *Women's Representation* at time $t$ will influence men's partianship at time $t$ or influence men's partisanship at some future time (e.g., $t + 1$)? This creates a challenge; including too many lags could introduce unnecessary multicollinearity into the model and reduce its efficiency, while including too few

[6]For more detailed discussion of Box-Jenkins modeling see Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2014)

lags could mean mischaracterizing the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. For each independent variable, multiple specifications of lag lengths were tested. Lag lengths were determined by balancing three criteria: model parsimony, the Akaike information criteria (AIC), and the Bayesian information criteria (BIC). Among these criteria, model parsimony was privileged, but alternative specifications were checked to ensure the robustness of the reported results.

# Results

I begin by estimating the bivariate relationships between partisanship and each independent variable because many of the series are fairly correlated.[7] After assessing the relationship between the covariates and men's and women's partisanship between 1950 and 2012, I analyze these relationships during the periods: before the 1980 election and after the 1980 election. It is important to understand how these relationships different during these respective time periods, given the prominence of the 1980 election in the literature on the gender gap and the patterns in Figure 1. I then turn to a multivariate specification of the models, again conducting analyses over the entire time period and before and after 1980.

The tables in the manuscript present the effect of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable on men's and women's partisanship and the difference of the effects. The full regression results can be found in the Appendix. Given that some variables contain multiple lags, reporting the effects allows us to efficiently assess the total influence a covariate has on the partisan attachments of men and women.

The bivariate results reported in Table 1 indicate that *Women's Representation* plays an important role in shaping the gender gap in partisanship. Over the entire time period (Panel

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[7]Some of this correlation is a result of how the variables are measured, for example both *Women's Representation* and *Southern Realignment* can only change after an election.

A), men's Democratic partisanship significantly declines as more women are elected and compose the Democratic congressional delegation. *Women's Representation* has a positive effect on women's Demcoratic partisanship but fails to reach traditional levels of statistical significance. More importantly, as Democratic women become a more visible part of the Democratic Party, men and women move in opposite directions, significantly contributing to the gender gap in partisanship (Panel A, Column 3).

Panel B of Table 1 reports results for men's and women's partisanship before 1980. Interestingly, the influence of *Women's Representation* is negative and statistically insignificant for both men and women during this early time period. Panel C of Table 1 reports effects after 1980. The effect of *Women's Representation* on men's partisanship is negative, but statistically insignificant. However, the influence of *Women's Representation* on women's partisanship is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the difference between the effects of *Women's Representation* on men's and women's partisanship is significant. Thus, women's increase visibility in the Democratic Party appears to influence both men's and women's partisanship. It has slowly caused men to move away from the Democratic Party over several decades. More recently, the increased presence of women in the Democratic congressional delegation has caused women to move towards the Democratic Party. These findings support the theoretical expectation that men and women use the composition of the party-in-government as a cue regarding which party best represents their gendered interests.

Increases in *Social Spending* have a positive effect on both men's and women's partisanship between 1950-2012, but the effect is only statistically significant for men. Before the 1980 election, increased *Social Spending* contributes to the gender gap even though it is associated with increases in both men's and women's Democratic partisanship. This is because *Social Spending* has a significantly larger effect on women's partisanship contributing to the early formation of the gender gap. After 1980, *Social Spending* is not significantly related to men's partisanship, women's partisanship, or the gap.

The effects of *Women's Workforce Participation* are mixed. Over the entire time period, *Women's Workforce Participation* is positively and significantly associated with increased men's Democratic Party identification. The effect is negative and insignificant for women's partisanship and the difference in the effects is not statistically significant. Before 1980, the effect of *Women's Workforce Participation* on Democratic partisanship is positive and significant for women, but the difference in effects across sex is insignificant. After 1980, *Women's Workforce Participation* has a positive and significant effect on men's partisanship and a negative but insignificant effect on women's partisanship. Importantly, the difference in the effects of women's workforce participation on men's and women's partisanship is significant after 1980. Thus, *Women's Workforce Participation* contributes to the gender gap and does so largely through its influence on men's partisanship during the post-1980 period. The limited effects of *Social Spending* and *Women's Workforce Participation* are surprising given their prominence in existing work on the gender gap (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010, Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999, Manza & Brooks 1998, Carroll 1988).

*Southern Realignment* shapes both men's and women's Democratic Partisanship. For the period 1950-2012, men's and women's partisanship are significantly related to the changing make-up of the South's congressional delegation. The difference between these effects for men and women, though, are not statistically significant. An analogous relationship is found before 1980, as both men and women respond to *Southern Realignment* in a similar fashion. After 1980, while men's and women's partisanship is moving in the same direction *Southern Realignment* no longer has a significant effect on women's partisanship. Moreover, the difference between men and women is statistically significant in this time period. The influence of Southern realignment matches the theoretical expectations that groups in the electorate respond to changes in the composition of party elites.

Neither *Consumer Sentiment* nor *Approval* appears to influence the gender gap in partisanship. *Consumer Sentiment* is positively and significantly related to women's partisanship

for the entire time period (Panel A) and before 1980 (Panel B). However, the difference in its effects across sex is never statistically significant. *Approval* is positively and significantly related to men's and women's partisanship before 1980 and women's after 1980. The difference in its effects on men's and women's partisanship, though, is never statistically significant.

Table 1: Effects on Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship – Bivariate Models

| | Men (90% CI) | Women (90% CI) | Difference (90% CI) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Complete Time Period 1950-2012** | | | |
| Women's Representation | **-0.30** | 0.10 | **-0.40**∗ |
| | (-0.58,-.001) | (-0.18,0.39) | (-.71,-0.08) |
| Social Spending | **0.23**∗ | 0.17 | 0.06 |
| | (0.05,0.42) | (-0.01,0.36) | (-0.09,0.21) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | **0.17** | -0.01 | 0.19 |
| | (0.01,0.34) | (-0.17,0.15) | (-0.04,0.43) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.79**∗ | **0.45**∗ | 0.33 |
| | (0.41, 1.16) | (0.07,0.82) | (-0.04,0.72) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.20 | **0.10** | 0.10 |
| | (-.01,.42) | (-.99, 1.21) | (-1.03,1.21) |
| Approval | .33 | 0.42 | -0.08 |
| | (-.04, .71) | (0.05, 0.79) | ( -0.41,0.25) |
| **Panel B: 1950- 1979** | | | |
| Women's Representation | -0.16 | -0.21 | 0.04 |
| | (-0.81,0.48) | (-0.84,0.42) | (-0.57,0.67) |
| Social Spending | **0.31**∗ | **0.70**∗ | **-0.39** |
| | (0.06,0.56) | (0.32,1.07) | (-0.74,-0.05) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | 0.03 | **0.31** | -0.28 |
| | (-0.26,0.34) | (0.02,0.60) | (-0.70, 0.15) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.41**∗ | **0.46**∗ | -0.04 |
| | (0.08,0.75) | (0.09,0.83) | ( -0.37,0.29) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.06 | **0.1**∗ | -0.14 |
| | (-0.03,0.15) | (0.08,0.31) | (-0.26,-0.02) |
| Approval | **0.11** | **0.10** | 0.02 |
| | (0.01,0.21) | (0.01,0.18) | (-0.11,0.15) |
| **Panel C: 1980-2014** | | | |
| Women's Representation | -0.17 | **0.22** | **0.39**∗ |
| | (-0.38,0.04) | ( 0.02,0.42) | (-0.69,-0.10) |
| Social Spending | -0.16 | -0.26 | 0.09 |
| | (-0.62,0.30) | (-0.54,0.004) | (-0.33,0.54) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | **0.36**∗ | -0.15 | **0.51**∗ |
| | (0.06,0.66) | (-0.43,0.12) | (0.10,0.93) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.61**∗ | 0.18 | **0.43**∗ |
| | (0.32,0.90) | ( -0.06,0.42) | (0.17,0.69) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| | (-0.01,0.12) | (-0.05,0.12) | (-0.06,0.10) |
| Approval | 0.003 | **0.06** | -0.06 |
| | (-0.07,0.08) | (0.004,0.12) | (-0.15,0.01) |

**Bold** values indicate significance at .90 level with a two-tailed test.
∗ indicates significance at .95 level with a two-tailed test.
Confidence intervals were calculated via simulation.

Table 2 reports the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables on men's and women's partisanship with the multivariate specifications. Consistent with the bivariate analysis and theoretical expectations, the increased visibility of women as part of the Democratic Party's congressional delegation has contributed to the gender gap. During the full time period (Table 2 Panel A), men's Democratic Partisanship is negatively related to increases in *Women's Representation*, while women's Democratic partisanship has a positive and statistically significant relationship with *Women's Representation*. Before 1980 men's and women's partisanship is positively related with women's increased presence in the Democratic Party's congressional delegation, but the effect is only significant for women. After 1980, the effect for *Women's Representation* on men's partisanship becomes negative but remains statistically insignificant. The effect of *Women's Representation* on women's partisanship remains positive, but is no longer statistically significant. However, as men's and women's partisanship moves in the opposite directions after 1980, the difference in the effects is statistically significant. The increased presence and visibility of women in the Democratic Party therefore has contributed to the growth of the gender gap. In particular, the evidence points to the effect largely working through women's partisanship, resulting from women increasing their identification with the Democratic Party.

In the multivariate analysis, *Social Spending* and *Women's Workforce Participation* have little effect on men's and women's partisanship or the gender gap. The effects of *Social Spending* on men's and women's partisanship is insignificant in all three time periods. Additionally, none of the differences in the effects for *Social Spending* are statistically significant. Similarly, the effects of *Women's Workforce Participation* on men's and women's partisanship are negative and statistically insignificant in each of the multivariate models. Moreover, none of the differences are statistically significant. While these results do not support the theoretical expectations, they do fit with Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin's (2004) finding that women's participation in the workforce does not influence the gender gap in partisan-

ship.

The multivariate results provide further evidence that *Southern Realignment* contributed to the formation of the gender gap. In all time periods, both men's and women's partisanship are positively related to *Southern Realignment*. This implies that both men's and women's Democratic Partisanship declined as Democrats made up less of the Southern delegation. The effect is statistically significant for all time periods, except for with women after 1980. Given the reduced effects of *Southern Realignment* on women's partisanship after 1980, the difference in the effects across sex is statistically significant during this period. Thus, while *Southern Realignment* reduced both men's and women's partisanship, it contributes to the gender gap after 1980 through larger effects on men's partisan attachments.

*Consumer Sentiment* does not contribute to the formation of the gender gap. Over the full time period and before 1980, *Consumer Sentiment* is positively related to both men's and women's partisanship, but none of the effects or the difference in effects are statistically significant. After 1980, *Consumer Sentiment* is negatively related to both men's and women's partisanship, but, again, the effects and the difference in effects are insignificant.

There is some evidence presidential approval contributes to the gender gap. Across all specifications of the multivariate model, men's partisanship is positively related to *Approval* and is statistically significant after 1980. *Approval* is negatively but insignificantly related to women's Democratic partisanship over the entire time period and before 1980. After 1980, men's partisanship is positively related to *Approval*, but remains statistically insignificant. However, after 1980 the difference in the effects of *Approval* on men's and women's partisanship is statistically significant. Thus, men's and women's differing reactions to presidents contribute to the size of the gender gap after 1980.

Table 2: The Effects on Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship – Multivariate Models

|  | Men (90% CI) | Women (90% CI) | Difference (90% CI) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Complete Time Period 1950-2012** | | | |
| Women's Representation | -0.02 | **0.19** | -0.24 |
|  | (-0.23,0.12) | (0.01,0.36) | ( -0.49,0.01) |
| Social Spending | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.10 |
|  | (-0.19,0.28) | (-0.09,0.38) | (-0.31,.11) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (-0.01,0.004) | (-0.01,0.01) | (-0.01,0.01) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.71**[*] | **0.47**[*] | 0.23 |
|  | (0.41,1.00) | (0.16,0.77) | (-0.10,0.59) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.15 | 0.21 | -0.05 |
|  | (-0.06,0.37) | (-0.07,0.49) | (-0.32,0.22) |
| Approval | 0.19 | -0.04 | 0.24 |
|  | (-0.20,0.58) | (-0.44,0.33) | (-0.11, 0.59) |
| **Panel B: 1950- 1979** | | | |
| Women's Representation | 0.19 | **0.28**[*] | -0.09 |
|  | (-0.02,0.41) | (0.06,.50) | (-0.28,0.10) |
| Social Spending | -0.04 | 0.12 | -0.16 |
|  | (-0.23,0.15) | (-0.07,0.31) | (-0.44,0.11) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | -0.002 | -0.0001 | -0.001 |
|  | (-0.01,0.004) | (-0.01,0.01) | (-0.01,.003) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.32**[*] | **0.54** | -0.21 |
|  | (-.01,0.55) | (0.25,0.82) | (-0.48,0.06) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
|  | (-0.0002,0.35) | (-0.08,0.26) | (-0.16,0.33) |
| Approval | 0.30 | -0.12 | **0.42**[*] |
|  | (0.03,0.58) | (-0.29,0.07) | (0.10,0.75) |
| **Panel C: 1980-2014** | | | |
| Women's Representation | -0.15 | 0.10 | **-0.25** |
|  | (-0.31,0.02) | (-0.08,0.27) | (-0.49,-0.004) |
| Social Spending | -0.16 | -0.12 | -0.03 |
|  | (-0.41,0.08) | (-0.38,0.13) | (-0.25,0.19) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | -0.0004 | -0.0005 | 0.0001 |
|  | (-0.006,0.005) | (-0.01, 0.01) | (-0.01, 0.01) |
| Southern Realignment | **0.56**[*] | 0.10 | **0.45**[*] |
|  | (0.27,0.84) | ( -0.12,0.34) | (0.19,0.73) |
| Consumer Sentiment | -0.07 | -0.19 | 0.12 |
|  | (-0.28,0.14) | (-0.41,0.03) | (-0.07,0.31) |
| Approval | **0.43**[*] | 0.13 | **0.30** |
|  | (0.16,0.71) | (-0.08,0.35) | (0.03,0.57) |

**Bold** values indicate significance at .90 level with a two-tailed test.
∗ indicates significance at .95 level with a two-tailed test.
Confidence intervals were calculated via simulation.

# Discussion & Conclusion

Examining the dynamics of men's and women's partisanship separately between 1950 and 2012 allows us to better understand how, when, and why the gender gap emerged and changes over time. Previous research on the gender gap largely theorized about the gap from the perspective of women's political behavior and did not take into account changes within the political parties. In contrast, I offer a theory that accounts for shifting partisan attachments of men and women based on changes within the parties. This theoretical framework helps explain how changes in both men's and women's partisanship have contributed to the formation and growth of the gender gap over time. My argument also accounts for transformations within the political parties. Party realignments and, more importantly, changes in the composition of party elites have sent messages to the electorate about whose interests the parties represent. My findings highlight the influence of the composition of party elites on mass party identification and is consistent with the parties signaling interests to groups and groups seeking representation of those interests in the parties. Symbolic representation of group interests acts as a signal for individuals seeking representation based on their social identities.

The empirical analyses demonstrate that both men's and women's behavior contribute to the gender gap. Changes in the parties, both in terms of the sex composition of the congressional delegations and Democratic representation in the South, signal who the parties represent, allowing groups to adjust their partisan attachments in hopes of better representation of their gendered social identities. Women's visibility and presence in the Democratic Party's congressional delegation influences both women's and men's partisanship, while Southern realignment mainly influences men's partisanship. Thus, the gender gap in partisanship is a function changes of *both* men's and women's partisanship. The changes in the parties that influence men's and women's partisan attachments are slow to play out. In order to

understand the dynamics of the gender gap, I examined men's and women's partisanship attachments before and after 1980 and over a longer time period than existing research. Additionally, breaking the series and examining the relationship between the covariates and men's and women's partisanship gives us further insight into the origins and growth of the gender gap.

The results concerning the sex composition of the congressional delegations suggest initial accounts of the gender gap as a product of the $2^{nd}$ wave of the women's movement may have been on to something. In the wake of the failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment and in response to the lack of action within the political parties, many $2^{nd}$ wave social movement organizations started programs to increase women's representation in government (Pimlott 2010, Barasko 2004). Initially, these efforts were non-partisan or bipartisan. However, changes in the relationships between feminism, social conservatism, and the political parties changed the political opportunity structure (Freeman 1986, Wolbrecht 2000). These transformations resulted in the women's movement disproportionately influencing the election of Democratic women compared to Republican women. Thus, by changing the composition of the party elite, the women's movement indirectly contributed to the formation and growth of the gender gap in partisanship.

There are mixed results concerning the influence of the New Deal and women's workforce participation. In the bivariate models these factors showed a significant relationship between either men's or women's partisanship and some contribution to the gender gap. However, in the fully specified models these relationships fall below traditional levels of significance. Given the difficulty of analyzing slow-moving, long-term trends, these factors likely play some role in shifting men away from and moving women towards the Democratic Party.

While this paper is largely about differences between men's and women's partisan attachments, the similarity in men's and women's partisanship is notable. A considerable degree of the movement in men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship is shared. As many

earlier studies have found, economic and political evaluations contribute to changes in party identification. This analysis shows that men and women generally have similar reactions to changes in economic and political evaluations. However, there is some evidence that suggests these relationships might vary across subgroups in the electorate. Further research is needed to help understand how sex conditions political and economic evaluations and how these different reactions may contribute to the gender gap.

The analysis and theory presented here highlight the importance of gender as a social identity that structures men's and women's political behavior. Moreover, the dynamic and persistent nature of changes in men's and women's behavior suggest gender will continue to be an important feature of electoral politics. Focusing on gender as a politically relevant social identity does not mean that it is the only relevant social identity. Rather, gender intersects with many other social identities, such as race and class, that also structure the political attitudes and behavior of the electorate. Furthermore, changes within the parties have important implications for the representation of multiple social identities. Additional research is needed to fully understand how these party dynamics influence representation and macro party identification.

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# A   Measuring Partisanship and Explanatory Variables

Overall, 1579 Gallup surveys were used to create the quarterly estimates. There is at least one survey every quarter and on average there are 6 surveys per quarter. The third quarter of 2000, the fourth quarter of 2001, and the fourth quarter of 2004 only have 1 survey. The fourth quarter of 1992 has the largest number of surveys in the quarter at 19. To construct the quarterly time series each Gallup Survey was downloaded from the Roper Center for Public Opinion. The surveys were then cleaned and recoded to ensure consistency over time. Surveys that spanned multiple months were coded as being conducted based on their start date. When the surveys were aggregated they were weighted based on their sample size. I calculate men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship as the proportion of Democrats among Democratic, Republican and independent identifiers for men and women, respectively.

Norrander (1997) raises the issue that the size of the gender gap may be influenced by how partisan leaners are treated. Unfortunately, Gallup fails to consistently ask independent identifiers if they lean towards one of the major parties. Additionally, Galllup also does not consistently ask partisans about the strength of their attachments. To maintain consistency over time, party identifiers consist of both strong and weak identifiers. Independent identifiers contain pure independents and those who lean towards one of the major political parties.

Some scholars have criticized the use of Gallup surveys because the partisanship question is different from the question used by other survey houses (Converse 1976, Abramson & Ostrom Jr 1991). Gallup asks "In politics today, do you considers yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Republican." They argue the phrase "In politics today" results in greater short-term variation than questions that use the phrase "Generally speaking." While there is evidence that the Gallup series do exhibit greater variation, this variation does not appear to

greatly influence substantive results (Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002, MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992, Bishop et al. 1994). Unfortunately, other surveys do not offer the rich time series that can be compiled from the Gallup surveys.

One potential obstacle with basing the time series on Gallup surveys is that Gallup changed their mode of interview from in-person to telephone. Many have observed that the telephone interviews produced samples that tended to be more Republican (Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002, Hugick 1991). If left uncorrected, there would be a drift towards the Republican party starting in the 1980s not present in the in-person interview or other survey houses. Past estimates of the bias reflected the population as a whole and did not examine if there are differences in the bias for men and women. I estimated the Republican bias introduced by telephone interviews for men and women separately and then adjusted the telephone samples before incorporating them into the time series.

Gallup continued to use both modes of interviews in the 1980s and 1990s, with the majority of the transition occurring between 1984 and 1995. Following Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson (2002), I use the in-person interviews as the base line. The estimates indicate that the bias is different for men and women. *Men's Democratic Macropartisanship* is 4 points lower in phone interviews compared to the in-person interviews while *Women's Democratic Macropartisanship* is 1.5 points lower in the phone interviews than in the in-person interviews.

Table A-1 reports the descriptive statistics for the unfiltered series, the AIRMA filter, and the descriptions of the filtered series for all variables in the analysis, including men's and women's partisanship. The top portion of Table A-1 reports the descriptive statistics for both men's and women's partisanship. Men's Democratic partisanship ranges from a low of 25.51 in the second quarter of 2011 and a high of 53.77 in the fourth quarter of 1961. Women's Democratic partisanship ranges from a low of 36.63 in the fourth quarter of 2011

and a high of 54.03 in the third quarter of 1961. The lower half of Table A-1 reports the descriptive statistics for the filtered men's and women's partisanship series and the ARIMA filter that was applied.

Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics

| Non-Whitened Series | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Max | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Men's Democratic Partisanship | 39.99 | 5.85 | 25.51 | 53.77 | |
| Women's Democratic Partisanship | 44.89 | 3.56 | 36.63 | 54.03 | |
| Social Spending GDP | 0.084 | 0.035 | 0.029 | 0.15 | |
| Women's Workforce Participation | 49.22 | 9.57 | 32.2 | 60.1 | |
| Women in Congress | 0.03 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.25 | |
| Southern Realignment | 0.65 | 0.19 | 0.30 | .94 | |
| Consumer Sentiment | 86.73 | 11.77 | 52.2 | 110.13 | |
| Approval | 53.28 | 12.74 | 23.33 | 87.13 | |
| Whitened Series | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Max | ARIMA Model |
| Men's Democratic Partisanship | 0.006 | 2.19 | -9.35 | 8.90 | (0,1,1) |
| Women's Democratic Partisanship | 0.006 | 2.18 | -8.14 | 7.88 | (0,1,1) |
| Social Spending GDP | 2.79e-11 | 0.003 | -0.03 | 0.027 | (0,1,0) |
| Women's Workforce Participation | -0.001 | 0.24 | -0.74 | 0.03 | AR(3 5 6) I(1) |
| Women in Congress | 1.10e-10 | 0.006 | -0.02 | 0.04 | (0,1,0) |
| Southern Realignment | -3.15e-10 | 0.02 | -0.15 | 0.07 | (0,1,0) |
| Consumer Sentiment | 0.07 | 4.93 | -15.89 | 16.33 | (0,1,0) |
| Approval | -0.14 | 6.13 | -32.81 | 32.25 | (1,0,0) |

*Women's Representation*: measures the increased presence and visibility of women in the Democrat Party's congressional delegation relative to the Republican Party. To capture the increased presence of Democratic women relative to Republican Women, I take the proportion of women in the Democrat Party's congressional delegation and subtract the number of women in the Republican Party's congressional delegation. Then, to represent how this differences would appear to the public, I multiple this value by the number of total number of female Democrats in Congress. Data were drawn from the Center for American Women and Politics.[1] Larger positive values therefore indicate an increased visibility of women in the Democratic Party's congressional delegation in absolute terms and relative to their representation in the Republican Party's congressional delegation.

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[1]http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/cong.pdf.

*Social Spending*:The social spending measure is based on data obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis. [2] To allow for comparison of values over time, the data in current dollars were converted into constant 1995 U.S. dollars using the GDP deflator.[3] This measure reflects government spending on a variety of social welfare policies where we find issue that we traditionally associate with both the increased expansion of the federal government under the New Deal, including social insurance, medical insurance, food stamps, and unemployment benefits.

*Southern Realignment*: measures the proportion of Democrats in the Southern delegation to the U.S. Congress. I used the party variables in Poole and Rosenthal's data sets to calculate this measure.[4]

*Women's Workforce Participation*: is the monthly civilian labor force participation rate for women that has been seasonally adjusted. I aggregate the series to the quarter by taking the simple average for each month in the quater. This is series LNS11300002 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics [5]

*Consumer Sentiment*: I use the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. This index is available quarterly back until 1952, with a few quarters missing early in the series. Any missing data were interpolated by using the average of the two time points before and after the missing observation. Because we would expect the effects to be different under Democratic presidents compared to Republican presidents, I code the series to be positive during Democratic administrations and negative during Republican administrations.

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[2]`http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=86&ViewSeries=NO&Java=`
`no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=1950&LastYear=2009&3Place=`
`N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no`. A break-down of the programs whose budgets were incorporated into
the series can be found at `http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/nipa_underlying/TableView.asp?`
`SelectedTable=`
`25&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Qtr&FirstYear=`
`1959&LastYear=`
`2009&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no`.

[3]Available at `http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php`.

[4]The original data can be found at `http://www.voteview.com/`.

[5]`http://www.bls.gov/data/`.

*Approval*: Reflects the percent approving of the president. The influence of the economy is purged from the approval measure by regressing an non-transformed consumer sentiment on the presidential approval series and using the residuals. The residuals were then multiplied by negative 1 during Republican presidential administrations.

# B  Results

This section contains the regression results that were used to calculate the effects reported in the manuscript. Tables A-2 - A-4 correspond to Table 1 in the manuscript. Tables A-5 - A-7 correspond to Table 2 in the manuscript. I start with the bivaraite specification for each variable allowing for contemporaneous effects and up to 8 lags. Insignificant lags were dropped one at a time, balancing model parsimony, the Akaike information criteria (AIC), and the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to determine the preferred lag specification. Among these criteria, model parsimony was privileged, but alternative specifications were checked to ensure the robustness of the reported results. To specify the multivariate analysis, I started with the preferred by bivariate lag-length specification. I then tested alternative model specifications by dropping insignificant lags, once again balancing AIC, BIC, and model parsimony.

Table A-2: Bivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship, 1950-2012

| | Social Spending | | | Women's Workforce | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | Women | | Men | Women |
| | (SE) | (SE) | | (SE) | (SE) |
| Social Spending$_{t-1}$ | 78.87** | 58.13 | Women's Workforce$_{t-6}$ | 0.73* | – |
| | (37.64) | ( 37.65) | | (0.42) | |
| | | | Women's Workforce$_{t-7}$ | – | -0.05 |
| | | | | | (0.42) |
| Constant | 0.004 | .01 | Constant | .004 | .01 |
| | (0.13) | (0.14) | | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| | Women in Congress | | | Southern Realignment | |
| | Men | Women | | Men | Women |
| | (SE) | (SE) | | (SE) | (SE) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-2}$ | – | 17.50 | Southern Realignment$_{t-2}$ | – | 9.06* |
| | | (17.64) | | | 5.39 |
| Women in Congress$_{t-4}$ | -28.45 | – | Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 16.62** | 15.65** |
| | (17.79) | | | ( 7.01) | (7.04) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-8}$ | -20.89 | -0.63 | Southern Realignment$_{t-4}$ | 18.06*** | – |
| | (24.03) | ( 23.84) | | (5.37) | |
| | | | Southern Realignment$_{t-8}$ | 4.79 | -2.15 |
| | | | | (7.01)) | (7.04) |
| Constant | 0.04 | 0.05 | Constant | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.14) | (0.14) | | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| | Consumer Sentiment | | | Approval | |
| | Men | Women | | Men | Women |
| | (SE) | (SE) | | (SE) | (SE) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-6}$ | – | 0.03 | Approval | 0.08*** | 0.09*** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-8}$ | 0.04 | 0.01 | Approval$_{t-1}$ | 0.04* | 0.04* |
| | (0.03) | (.03) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| | | | Approval$_{t-6}$ | -0.05** | -0.05** |
| | | | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | -0.02 | -.01 | Constant | 0.003 | 0.01 |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | | (0.13) | (0.13) |

Two-tailed significance test: * $\leq 0.10$, ** $\leq 0.05$, *** $\leq 0.01$

Table A-3: Bivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship , Before 1980

| | Social Spending | | | Women's Workforce | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Men (SE) | Women (SE) | | Men (SE) | Women (SE) |
| Social Spending$_{t-1}$ | 101.24** ( 50.45) | 92.82* ( 49.54) | Women's Workforce$_{t-4}$ | – | 1.31* (0.73) |
| Social Spending$_{t-2}$ | – ( 37.31) | 76.28** (0.76) | Women's Workforce$_{t-6}$ | .013 | – |
| Social Spending$_{t-4}$ | – | 63.91* (36.97) | | | |
| Constant | 0.06 (0.21) | 0.06 (0.20) | Constant | -0.05 (0.18) | 0.004 (0.17) |

| | Women in Congress | | | Southern Realignment | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Men (SE) | Women (SE) | | Men (SE) | Women (SE) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-2}$ | 69.46 (41.1) | 64.22 (40.72) | Southern Realignment$_{t-2}$ | – | 9.38 (5.37) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-4}$ | -61.41** (30.31) | – | Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 16.29 (7.19) | 15.66 (7.04) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-6}$ | -35.41 ( 40.88) | -65.35 (40.43) | Southern Realignment$_{t-8}$ | 4.38 (7.18) | -2.15 ( 7.04) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-7}$ | – | -33.85 (29.98) | | | |
| Constant | 0.11 (0.21) | 0.11 (0.21) | Constant | 0.04 (0.14) | .05 (0.14) |

| | Consumer Sentiment | | | Approval | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Men (SE) | Women (SE) | | Men (SE) | Women (SE) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_t$ | – | 0.09** (0.03) | Approval$_t$ | 0.10 (0.04) | – |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-1}$ | 0.04 (0.03) | – | Approval$_{t-1}$ | – | 0.07 (0.03) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-3}$ | – | 0.06** (0.03) | Approval$_{t-2}$ | 0.06 (0.03) | – |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-8}$ | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | Approval$_{t-5}$ | – | 0.06 (0.03) |
| | | 0.04 | Approval$_{t-6}$ | – | -0.04 (0.03) |
| | | | Approval$_{t-8}$ | -0.04 (0.03) | – |
| Constant | 0.05 (0.21) | 0.10 (0.20) | Constant | 0.04 (0.22) | -0.01 (0.22) |

Two-tailed significance test: * ≤ 0.10, ** ≤ 0.05, *** ≤ 0.01

Table A-4: Bivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship , After 1980

| | Social Spending Men (SE) | Social Spending Women (SE) | | Women's Workforce Men (SE) | Women's Workforce Women (SE) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Spending$_t$ | 75.82* (46.17) | – | Women's Workforce$_{t-3}$ | 1.52** (0.76) | – |
| Social Spending$_{t-4}$ | -82.46* ( 45.49) | – | Women's Workforce$_{t-7}$ | – | -0.63 (0.71) |
| Social Spending$_{t-6}$ | 94.27** (44.53) | – | | | |
| Social Spending$_{t-7}$ | -143.16** (54.60) | -88.86* (54.70) | | | |
| Constant | -0.05 (0.16) | -0.02 (0.17) | Constant | -0.01 (0.18) | -0.04 (0.17) |
| | **Women in Congress** Men (SE) | **Women in Congress** Women (SE) | | **Southern Realignment** Men (SE) | **Southern Realignment** Women (SE) |
| Women in Congress$_t$ | -29.07 (21.82) | – | Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 6.69 (5.34) | – |
| Women in Congress$_{t-7}$ | – | 36.95* ( 20.49) | Southern Realignment$_{t-4}$ | 23.74*** (7.01) | 8.85 (7.24) |
| Constant | -0.04 (.18) | -0.05 (0.17) | Constant | 0.01 (0.13) | -0.003 (0.14) |
| | **Consumer Sentiment** Men (SE) | **Consumer Sentiment** Women (SE) | | **Approval** Men (SE) | **Approval** Women (SE) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-1}$ | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.02 (0.04) | Approval$_t$ | 0.08** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.03) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-6}$ | – | 0.01 (0.03) | Approval$_{t-1}$ | 0.03* (0.02) | |
| | | | Approval$_{t-4}$ | -0.05** (0.02) | |
| | | | Approval$_{t-6}$ | -0.06** (0.02) | -0.04* (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.08 (0.21) | 0.08 (0.21) | Constant | -0.07 (0.16) | -0.04 (0.16) |

Two-tailed significance test: * $\leq$ 0.10, ** $\leq$ 0.05, *** $\leq$ 0.01

Table A-5: Multivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship , 1950-2012

|  | Men (SE) | Women (SE)) |
|---|---|---|
| Social Spending$_{t-1}$ | 14.57 | 47.93 |
|  | ( 48.00) | (48.50) |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-1}$ | -0.09 |  |
|  | (0.18) | – |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-6}$ | 0.08 |  |
|  | (0.17) | – |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-7}$ | – | -0.003 |
|  |  | (0.01) |
| Women in Congress | – | 31.05* |
|  |  | (17.82) |
| Women in Congress$_{t-4}$ | -9.60 | – |
|  | (18.04) |  |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-2}$ | – | 11.93** |
|  |  | (5.71) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 17.48** | 11.68* |
|  | (6.82) | (6.99) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-4}$ | 18.19 | – |
|  | (5.47) |  |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-6}$ | – | 0.03 |
|  |  | (0.02) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-8}$ | 0.03 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.03) | ( 0.03) |
| Approval$_t$ | 0.04* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Approval$_{t-1}$ | -0.04* | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Approval$_{t-6}$ | 0.03 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.35 | 0.17 |
|  | (0.84) | (0.76) |

Two-tailed significance test: * $\leq 0.10$, ** $\leq 0.05$, *** $\leq 0.01$

Table A-6: Multivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship , Before 1980

| | Men (SE) | Women (SE)) |
|---|---|---|
| Social Spending$_{t-1}$ | -14.84 (39.54) | – |
| Social Spending$_{t-2}$ | – | 40.48 ( 38.52) |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-4}$ | – | -0.0005 (0.02) |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-6}$ | -0.01 (0.02) | |
| Women in Congress$_{t-2}$ | 32.25 (22.14) | 47.55 (21.80) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-2}$ | – | 11.64** (5.70) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 16.42** ( 6.82) | 15.30** |
| Consumer Sentiment$_t$ | – | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-8}$ | 0.04* (0.02) | (6.67) |
| Approval$_t$ | 0.03 (0.02) | – |
| Approval$_{t-2}$ | 0.02 (0.02) | – |
| Approval$_{t-6}$ | – | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.43 (0.78) | -0.01 (0.78) |

Two-tailed significance test: * $\leq$ 0.10, ** $\leq$ 0.05, *** $\leq$ 0.01

Table A-7: Multivariate Model of Men's and Women's Democratic Partisanship, After 1980

| | Men (SE) | Women (SE)) |
|---|---|---|
| Social Spending$_{t-7}$ | -54.88 (50.26) | -43.78 (52.26) |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-4}$ | – | -.002 |
| Women's Workforce$_{t-6}$ | -0.001 (0.01) | – (0.02) |
| Women in Congress$_t$ | -24.79 ( 17.21) | – |
| Women in Congress$_{t-7}$ | – | 16.30 (17.65) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-3}$ | 6.80 (5.25) | 5.23 (7.15) |
| Southern Realignment$_{t-4}$ | 21.07*** (6.86) | – |
| Consumer Sentiment$_{t-1}$ | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.03) |
| Approval$_t$ | 0.03* (.02) | – |
| Approval$_{t-6}$ | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.12 (0.75) | 0.11 (0.79) |

Two-tailed significance test: * $\leq$ 0.10, ** $\leq$ 0.05, *** $\leq$ 0.01

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