Abortion Attitudes and Polarization in the American Electorate
Erin C. Cassese, Heather L. Ondercin, and Jordan Randall.
About two-thirds of Americans support legal abortion in many or all circumstances, and this group finds itself a frustrated majority following the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade. Previous scholarship argues intense minorities can secure favorable policy outcomes when facing off against a more diffuse and less motivated majority, but the role preference intensity plays in abortion politics is poorly understood. In this Element, we develop and validate a measure of preference intensity using data from the American National Election Studies (2008-2020). We find Americans with high preference intensity hold more extreme views on abortion, report more intense emotional reactions to proposed policy change, and participate in politics at higher rates. We extend our analysis into the post-Dobbs era using data from the 2022 midterm elections, and the results suggest abortion is poised to play a key role in voter mobilization, particularly among Democrats, in 2024 and beyond.
About two-thirds of Americans support legal abortion in many or all circumstances, and this group finds itself a frustrated majority following the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade. Previous scholarship argues intense minorities can secure favorable policy outcomes when facing off against a more diffuse and less motivated majority, but the role preference intensity plays in abortion politics is poorly understood. In this Element, we develop and validate a measure of preference intensity using data from the American National Election Studies (2008-2020). We find Americans with high preference intensity hold more extreme views on abortion, report more intense emotional reactions to proposed policy change, and participate in politics at higher rates. We extend our analysis into the post-Dobbs era using data from the 2022 midterm elections, and the results suggest abortion is poised to play a key role in voter mobilization, particularly among Democrats, in 2024 and beyond.
Politicized Identities and the Partisan Gender Gap
Gendered social identities capture the importance of an individual’s connection with gender-based groups and the socially constructed meaning around those groups. Gendered social identities have always been politically relevant, shaping the experiences, expectations, rights, and positions of men and women in the U.S. political system. However, I argue that gendered social identities were not useful to individuals when forming partisan attachments in earlier points of U.S. history because these identities did not help define what it meant to be a Democrat or Republican. Changes to the parties’ coalitions and party images during the 1960s and 1970s shifted the perceptions of the political parties to incorporate gendered social identities. Being a Republican became connected with gendered social identities influenced by a more traditional gender worldview. Being a Democrat became associated with gendered social identities shaped by a progressive gender worldview. Once gendered social identities helped define the prototypical partisan, individuals used these gendered social identities to determine which party was a better match.